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DNA COLLECTION ACTS AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT: A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE 
REFORM IN GEORGIA TO IMPLEMENT 
COLLECTION OF ARRESTEES’ DNA 
M. Binford Griffin 
INTRODUCTION 
In Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of Maryland’s DNA Collection Act (the Act), 1 
which permits the warrantless collection of deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) from arrestees who have not yet been convicted.2 In the King 
decision, the Court was called upon to determine whether law 
enforcement’s taking and analyzing an arrestee’s DNA were searches 
or seizures under the Fourth Amendment.3 The Court combined the 
two separate Fourth Amendment issues of collecting an arrestee’s 
DNA with a buccal swab4 and analyzing the DNA in the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Combined DNA Index System 
(“CODIS”).5 While the Court’s opinion analyzes only Maryland law, 
                                                                                                                 
  J.D. Candidate, 2016, Georgia State University College of Law. A huge thank you to the Board 
and Members of the Georgia State University Law Review for all of your time and effort spent editing; 
this Note would not have been possible without your diligence. Thank you Professor Nirej Sekhon for 
your guidance and critiques throughout the writing process. Last but not least, thank you Mom, Dad, 
Neil, and friends for putting up with me through the writing process. 
 1. See generally Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. 
SAFETY § 2-504 (LexisNexis 2011) (requiring collection of a DNA sample from individuals charged 
with violent crimes or attempted violent crimes; as well as burglary or attempted burglary). 
 2. § 2-504(a)–(b). 
 3. See generally King, 133 S. Ct. 1958; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Strictly speaking, the Fourth 
Amendment applies only to the federal government, but the Fourteenth Amendment extends the same 
standards to the states. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) 
(holding that the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy is applicable to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 4. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965. A buccal swab is obtained from the arrestees by rubbing a “flocked 
synthetic swab” against the parotid gland area of the mouth (cheek) for 30 seconds to collect samples of 
nuclear DNA. See Materials and Methods for Specimen Collection, Storage, and Shipment, CTR. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/mumps/lab/specimen-collect.html (last 
updated May 29, 2015); see also How to Collect a Buccal Swab Sample for Forensic Analysis, PURITAN 
MED. PRODS. (Aug. 25, 2014, 11:24 AM), http://blog.puritanmedproducts.com/how-to-collect-a-buccal-
swab-sample-for-forensic-analysis. 
 5. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1968. Combining the issues has caused much confusion in lower courts. See, 
1
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the implications of the holding are national.6 Other state legislatures 
with similar arrestee DNA collection laws must conform their 
respective statutes with the specific factors enumerated in King to 
remain constitutional.7 
Georgia’s current DNA collection law limits collection to 
convicted felons,8 but should be extended to include arrestees as a 
result of the Maryland v. King holding.9 In applying a reasonableness 
balancing test, the Court held in Maryland v. King that the 
government’s interests in promoting safety and identifying arrested 
individuals outweighed the privacy interests of the arrestee, thus 
making collection of DNA from arrested individuals a reasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment. 10  Weighing against the 
government interests, the Court evaluated the Act’s individual 
privacy protections, noting that the Act limited the collection to those 
arrested for violent felonies, expressly limited the scope of genetic 
information that police could obtain from arrestees, and provided 
procedures for automatic expungement.11 Georgia’s current statute 
regarding DNA collection does not include strict limits on these 
issues, except to leave the procedures for collecting and 
                                                                                                                 
e.g., Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753 (Md. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1509 (2015) (holding that the 
collection of DNA by scraping skin cells of a suspect who voluntarily entered the police station was 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment because the suspect had abandoned his skin cells and no 
longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in regards to what the skin cells contained); see also 
Elizabeth E. Joh, Maryland v. King: Policing and Genetic Privacy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 281, 282 
(2013). 
 6. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1968. 
 7. Id. at 1967–69. See People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), petition for 
review granted, 342 P.3d 415 (Cal. 2015), for an example of a non-compliant statute deemed 
unconstitutional under the state constitution. 
 8. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-160(b) (2012). 
 9. S.B. 77, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015) (Senate Committee Substitute) (proposing 
legislation to amend O.C.G.A § 35-3-160 to include arrestee DNA in the federal database). Senate Bill 
77 was introduced during the 2015 Regular Session, but did not pass out of the Senate Chamber. Id. Due 
to the structure of the Georgia General Assembly, the bills still remaining at the end of the even-
numbered calendar year are eligible to carry over into the next calendar year’s session. GA. CONST. art. 
III, § 4, para. 1. Therefore, Senate Bill 77 will begin the 2016 legislative session as substituted by the 
Senate Committee on Judiciary Non-Civil. Ga. S.B. 77. 
 10. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (holding that because the “valid arrest supported by probable cause,” 
which diminished the arrestee’s reasonable expectation of privacy, was outweighed by the state’s 
interest in identifying the individual through the use of a “routine booking procedure,” collecting the 
arrestee’s DNA was considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). 
 11. Id. at 1967. 
2
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disseminating the genetic information to the judgment of the Division 
of Forensic Sciences of the Georgia Bureau of Investigations.12 Out 
of the important factors to the Court, Georgia’s proposed legislation 
only addresses the types of serious offenses that would trigger DNA 
collection upon arrest.13 Contrasting Maryland’s statute, Georgia’s 
proposed statute allows DNA collection from individuals arrested for 
“serious offenses,”14 does not prohibit familial searches, and requires 
action by the arrestee to expunge his DNA profile, which the 
Supreme Court could deem too broad and unspecific.15 Federal law 
limits CODIS database access to states that carefully control privacy 
issues in DNA collection protocol;16 so without further restrictions, 
Georgia’s lenient regulations could cause the federal government to 
deny Georgia continued CODIS privileges. 
This Note compares Maryland’s DNA Collection Act to Georgia’s 
statutory equivalent, focusing on the factors established in Maryland 
v. King. Part I describes what DNA is and how law enforcement uses 
DNA information.17 It further details how DNA collection fits into 
current Fourth Amendment law and its exceptions as well as the 
problems with Georgia’s DNA collection statute based on the King 
decision.18 Part II compares the decision in King and the foundational 
Act behind it with leading cases on DNA from Georgia and 
Georgia’s proposed DNA Collection Act.19 Part II also discusses, 
                                                                                                                 
 12. § 35-3-160(c) (“The analysis shall be performed by the division.”); see also GA. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION - DIV. OF FORENSIC SCIS., DNA OPERATIONS MANUAL (2013), https://gbi-
dofs.com/QualitySystem/documentbrowser.aspx (follow “Official Manuals” folder in left pane; then 
follow “Operations” folder; then follow “DNA” folder; then follow “DNA OPERATIONS” hyperlink); 
GA. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION - DIV. OF FORENSIC SCIS., CODIS OPERATIONS MANUAL (2014), 
https://gbi-dofs.com/QualitySystem/documentbrowser.aspx (follow “Office Manuals” folder in left 
pane; then “Operations” folder; then “CODIS” folder). 
 13. Ga. S.B. 77. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Compare § 35-3-160(b), and Ga. S.B. 77 (allowing collection from individuals arrested for a 
“serious offense”), with MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504 (LexisNexis 2011) (providing that DNA 
may be collected from individuals charged with violent crimes upon a finding of probable cause). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(c) (2012). “Failure to comply. Access to the index established by this section 
is subject to cancellation if the quality control and privacy requirements described in subsection 
(b) . . . are not met.” Id. 
 17. See infra Part I.A.  
 18. See infra Part I.B–C. 
 19. See infra Part II. 
3
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through exposure of the shortcomings of Georgia’s proposed DNA 
collection Act, why reform is necessary. 20  Part III proposes a 
commission to regulate Georgia’s DNA collection laws as well as 
specific changes that must be made to Georgia’s proposed DNA 
collection Act before it is passed.21 
I. DNA COLLECTION AND THE LAW 
A. DNA: What Is It And How Does Law Enforcement Use It? 
DNA is genetic material used to identify individuals based on the 
specific genome sequences contained within each cell of the body.22 
The type of DNA typically used to identify an individual is contained 
in samples of body fluids, skin cells, bones, or hair follicles.23 Within 
the DNA molecule, the genetic locations used only for identification 
purposes are referred to as the CODIS 13 or the CODIS Core Loci.24 
DNA technology has been very useful to law enforcement through 
its “unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and 
to identify the guilty.” 25  DNA technology “has the potential to 
significantly improve both the criminal justice system and police 
investigative practices.”26 DNA has become a powerful tool for law 
enforcement through the implementation and use of DNA databases 
nationwide. 27  In response to congressional passage of the DNA 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See infra Part II.B. 
 21. See infra Part III.A. 
 22. Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA), NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/ 
25520880 (last updated June 16, 2015). 
 23. DNA Casework Unit (DCU), FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/biometric-analysis/dna-casework-unit-dcu-1 (last visited Jan. 13, 2016) (“Nuclear DNA 
(nDNA) . . . is typically analyzed in evidence containing body fluids, skin cells, bones, and hairs that 
have tissue at their root ends. The power of nDNA testing lies in the ability to identify an individual as 
being the source of the DNA . . . .”). 
 24. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index 
System, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-
and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Jan. 13, 2016) [hereinafter FBI FAQs on CODIS and DNA]. 
 25. Dist. Att’y’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55 (2009). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USING DNA TO SOLVE COLD CASES 9 
(2002), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/194197.pdf (describing a “success story” where a Florida 
man who died in a drug deal was connected to seven unsolved rape cases in Washington, D.C. by 
including his DNA profile in the national forensic index); see also Rapid DNA Act 2015: Hearing on 
4
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Identification Act of 1994,28 the FBI created a national system for 
maintaining and storing DNA profiles of certain individuals in 
collaboration with state and local laboratories. 29  The DNA 
Identification Act of 1994 established requirements for federal, state, 
and local law enforcement participation in the national program, 
including limiting the classes of individuals from whom DNA is 
collected,30 laboratory qualifications and standards,31 procedures to 
expunge samples,32 and limiting collection to “DNA identification 
records.” 33  Because of the strict compliance requirements of the 
national database, some states and localities have created their own—
largely unregulated—”offline” DNA databases with samples taken 
from anyone and everyone encountering law enforcement, including 
crime victims and witnesses.34 
Scholars disagree on the potential impact of implementing a 
national DNA database35 and many arguments focus on the negative 
                                                                                                                 
H.R. 320 Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 14 (2015) (prepared statement of Amy S. Hess, Executive 
Assistant Director, Science and Technology Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (describing the 
importance of an “expanded scope of collection, the commitment to analyze sexual assault evidence kits 
and the use of a John Doe indictment” to allow prosecution of a 20-year old sexual assault which was 
accomplished through the collection of arrestee DNA and the CODIS database). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2012) (allowing the development of a National DNA Index System). 
 29. See FBI FAQs on CODIS and DNA, supra note 24. 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) (allowing the FBI to establish an index of: DNA samples from crime 
scenes, DNA samples recovered from unidentified human remains, DNA samples voluntarily 
contributed from family members of missing persons, and “DNA identification records of: persons 
convicted of crimes; persons who have been charged in an indictment or information with a crime; and 
other persons whose DNA samples are collected under applicable legal authorities” as long as that 
individual provided the sample to be excluded as a suspect). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(2) (stating that the CODIS database shall only include information on 
DNA profiles that are prepared in laboratories that are accredited by a “nonprofit professional 
association of persons actively involved in forensic science that is nationally recognized within the 
forensic science community; and” that “undergo external audits” every two years that ensure 
compliance with the standards determined by the FBI Director). 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d) (stating that the director of the FBI and the State are responsible for 
expunging DNA profiles of individuals convicted of a federal offense or a local offense, respectively, 
whose conviction has been overturned or has been dismissed prior to trial). 
 33. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 14132; FBI FAQs on CODIS and DNA, supra note 24. 
 34. Joh, Policing and Genetic Privacy, supra note 5, at 286; see also Joseph Goldstein, Police 
Agencies Are Assembling Records of DNA, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/06/13/us/police-agencies-are-assembling-records-of-dna.html?smid=pl-share. 
 35. See generally Andrea Roth, Maryland v. King and the Wonderful, Horrible DNA Revolution in 
Law Enforcement, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 295 (2013); see also David H. Kaye, Maryland v. King: Per 
Se Unreasonableness, the Golden Rule, and the Future of DNA Databases, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 39, 47 
5
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effects of expanding the databases to include arrestees.36  Yet the 
most troublesome aspect of DNA collection laws is the growing 
number of unregulated databanks, which will continue to increase 
unless and until legally restricted.37 
B. The Fourth Amendment, Reasonableness Balancing, And DNA 
Collection 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable 
searches and seizures by imposing a requirement for probable cause 
to issue a warrant.38 Over time, the rules requiring probable cause 
and warrants have amalgamated with a “form of reasonableness 
balancing” to determine whether a search was justified under the 
Fourth Amendment. 39  To discern what is reasonable, the Court 
                                                                                                                 
(2013); Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, The Expanding Use of DNA in Law Enforcement: 
What Role for Privacy?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 153, 154 (2006); Rana Santos, Why DNA Databasing is 
Good for Maryland: A DNA Analyst’s Perspective, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 591, 608 (2013) (“From a 
purely scientific point of view, more data is better.”).. 
 36. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Make no mistake about 
it: As an entirely predictable consequence of today’s decision, your DNA can be taken and entered into 
a national DNA database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason.”); Joh, 
supra note 5, Policing and Genetic Privacy, at 285 (claiming that the expansion to arrestees gives police 
an incentive to make more arrests); see also Kelly Ferrell, Comment, Twenty-First Century 
Surveillance: DNA “Data-Mining” and the Erosion of the Fourth Amendment, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 229, 
243 (2013) (arguing that the federal statute is the most expansive in including all arrestees, causing 
problems when the states individually impose more specific restrictions); Carlos Jordi, Comment, 
Diminished Returns: The Exorbitance of Collecting DNA From All Arrestees, 26 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
346, 348 (2014) (seeking to “examine the effects of a criminal justice system where DNA is collected 
from everyone who is arrested, regardless of the seriousness of the charge”); Brian Clark Stuart, 
Comment, Dethroning King: Why the Warrantless DNA Testing of Arrestees Should Be Prohibited 
Under State Constitutions, 83 MISS. L.J. 1111, 1132–56 (2014). 
 37. See Ferrell, supra note 36, at 233; see also SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC 
JUSTICE: DNA DATA BANKS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 29–30, 36 (2011) 
(suggesting stricter federal regulations since, historically, the states have followed the federal 
government’s lead in DNA database regulations as a means “toward forensic DNA harmonization”); 
Elizabeth E. Joh, Artificial Intelligence and the Law: Essay: Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the 
Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 67–68 (2014) (concluding that the use of “big data” is likely 
to become a normal part of police procedures, so courts and legislatures should plan to impose limits on 
its use). 
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause . . . . ”); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on 
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 395 (1974); Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; 
Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1721–22 (1996). 
 39. Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment, 68 U. 
6
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balances the interests of the government against the privacy interests 
of the individual and degree of the search’s intrusiveness. 40  The 
Court measures an individual’s privacy interests through the relevant 
facts and circumstances of the situation to establish whether that 
individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the target of the 
search.41 If the government interest outweighs the individual interest, 
the Supreme Court considers the search reasonable.42 
Despite the presumption that “reasonableness generally requires a 
warrant,” the Supreme Court has excused warrantless searches under 
certain circumstances.43 In some circumstances, the Court has simply 
relaxed the need for a warrant based on reduced expectations of 
privacy.44 “Special needs” searches are also considered an exception 
to the warrant requirement.45 The Court has used the special needs 
                                                                                                                 
MIAMI L. REV. 589, 602 (2014). See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 346 (1985) (upholding 
the search of a student’s purse in a public school based on reasonable suspicion and lacking probable 
cause); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (serving as the foundation of “reasonableness” searches); 
Camera v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 538–40 (1967) (upholding the constitutionality of a 
warrantless house inspection not based on individualized suspicion). 
 40. Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 271–73 
(2011) (noting that special subpopulation searches have typically been conducted in order to “further 
important government interests independent of law enforcement”). 
 41. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (reasoning that there is a “twofold requirement, 
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). See also Steven D. Schwinn, 
Does the Fourth Amendment Allow a State to Collect and Analyze DNA from People Arrested for, but 
Not Convicted of, Serious Crimes?, 40 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 214, 215 (2013), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/public_education/MarylandvKing_ABA_Preview5
_021913.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 42. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1977–78 (2013). 
 43. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Schwinn, supra note 41, at 215; 
see also, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633–35 (1989); Nat’l Treasury Emps. 
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 678–679 (1989). 
 44. See Schwinn, supra note 41, at 215; see also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 853 (2006) 
(holding that a parolee had a lower expectation of privacy than a probationer would have); Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984) (holding that a prisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy 
inside his jail cell). 
 45. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668 (“[I]n certain limited circumstances, the Government’s need to 
discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling to 
justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of 
individualized suspicion.”); see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. “Therefore, in the context of safety and 
administrative regulations, a search unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable ‘when “special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable.”‘” Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 
829 (2002) (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)). 
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exception to uphold suspicionless drug testing of railway workers,46 
high school students involved in extracurricular activities, 47  and 
Treasury employees; 48  but government interests were not strong 
enough to apply the exception to political candidates.49 The Court has 
also upheld searches of public school students and their belongings, 
which lacked individualized suspicion,50 illegal immigrants crossing 
at border checkpoints,51 and vehicles stopped during roadblocks to 
discover drunk driving 52 —but not to uncover drugs because the 
primary purpose of the search was to discover criminal activity.53 
With the King decision, “reasonableness” has moved to the forefront 
of the special needs exception’s application to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.54 
The Supreme Court applied this “reasonableness balancing” in 
Maryland v. King by comparing the government’s need to properly 
identify arrestees, with the arrestee’s right to privacy in light of the 
minimally invasive nature of the buccal swab. 55  The Court 
determined that the legitimate government interest to protect was 
“the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to 
process and identify the persons and possessions they must take into 
custody.”56 The Court weighed this government interest against the 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. 
 47. Earls, 536 U.S. at 829–30 (applying the special needs exception to all high school students 
wishing to participate in extracurricular activities); Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 
(1995) (applying the special needs exception to searches of high school athletes). 
 48. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679. 
 49. See generally Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
 50. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–43 (1985). 
 51. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976). 
 52. See generally Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Stiz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 53. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000). 
 54. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013) (stating that the special needs precedent cases 
did not have a bearing on the issues presented in this case, yet formulating the outcome in the same 
manner that special needs cases are analyzed—by balancing government interests against personal 
interests to determine reasonableness). See also Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA 
Testing and the Divided Court, 127 HARV. L. REV. 161, 183 (2013). 
 55. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1977 (In order to justify a warrantless, suspicionless search, “[t]he 
government interest must outweigh the degree to which the search invades an individual’s legitimate 
expectations of privacy.”). 
 56. Id. at 1970–75 (qualifying the government interests on five grounds: (1) the individual was 
lawfully arrested based on probable cause and it could be considered a routine booking procedure used 
to identify the individual properly, which is an important aspect of all criminal cases because; (2) law 
enforcement has the responsibility of keeping the jail safe and knowing criminal history to a certainty 
8
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arrestee’s reduced expectation of privacy due to his relationship with 
the state, leading the Court to conclude that both taking and 
analyzing King’s DNA were reasonable.57 
The Supreme Court held the Maryland DNA Collection Act 
constitutional because it authorizes DNA collection from individuals 
arrested for violent crimes58 and the DNA is not entered into the 
CODIS database until after arraignment.59 Further, DNA samples are 
destroyed if the individual is never convicted or is pardoned,60 and 
there are limits on the type of genetic information included in a DNA 
profile61 and how it may be used.62 The Maryland v. King factors are 
                                                                                                                 
may help prevent risks; (3) the State has a substantial interest in ensuring the correct individual accused 
will be present for trial; (4) knowing the identity concretely may help determine whether the offender 
may be released on bail, without fear he or she will pose a threat to the community; and (5) the 
possibility that the DNA of an arrestee links to the perpetrator could free an innocent person being held 
for the crime). 
 57. Id. at 1977–80 (holding the search reasonable because King was arrested on probable cause, 
reducing his expectation of privacy, and the DNA collection procedure was minimally intrusive—
without threat to King’s safety or privacy). 
 58. Id. at 1967; MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 59. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967; § 2-504(d)(1). 
 60. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967; §§ 2-504(d)(2)(i),; § 2-511(a)(1). Many states have a similar 
requirement: COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-23-104(b) (2013) (Colorado: expunging the DNA sample and 
profile without confirmation of a felony charge within one year of receiving the sample); MD. CODE 
ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-511(a) (LexisNexis 2011) (Maryland: making expungement automatic if the 
person is not convicted); MO. REV. STAT. § 650.055(10)–(11) (2013) (Missouri: automatically 
expunging the DNA sample and profile if the prosecutor declines to prosecute, if the charges are 
dropped or dismissed, there was no probable cause to support the arrest, or the arrestee is acquitted); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-266.3A(h)(1) (West 2013) (North Carolina: making the prosecutor 
responsible for handling expungement if the charge is dismissed, the person is acquitted, the person is 
convicted of a misdemeanor not included in list of charges for which DNA may be collected, the statute 
of limitations arrives with no charge, or if the individual is not convicted within three years of the 
sample being taken); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-600(A) (2009) (South Carolina: making the prosecutor 
responsible for expunging the DNA sample and profile if the charges are dropped, dismissed, reduced to 
a charge not listed in statute, or if the person is acquitted); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321(e)(2) (2013) 
(Tennessee: making the clerk of court responsible for alerting the state laboratory of the final disposition 
of the criminal charge and instructing the laboratory to destroy the DNA sample and profile if the 
individual is acquitted or the charge was dismissed); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.1471(e) (West 
2012) (Texas: making the court responsible for ordering the state to destroy the sample if the individual 
is acquitted or the case is dismissed); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-10-406(1)(i) (LexisNexis 2010) (Utah: 
expunging the DNA sample and profile if criminal charges are not filed within ninety days of booking); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1940(b) (2011) (Vermont: making the court responsible for instructing the 
state to destroy the DNA sample and profile if the charge is dismissed or downgraded to a misdemeanor 
under a plea agreement, the person is acquitted, or if the person is convicted of a lesser offense than one 
that requires collection). 
 61. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967; MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2011) 
(“Only DNA records that directly relate to the identification of individuals shall be collected and 
stored.”); § 2-512(c) (“A person may not willfully test a DNA sample for information that does not 
9
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foundational requirements for a state DNA collection statute to be 
constitutional and Georgia’s proposed statute does not include these 
factors.63 
C. Problems With Georgia’s Current Statute 
Georgia’s DNA collection statute begins in O.C.G.A. § 35-3-160, 
which allows DNA collection from convicted felons.64 In February 
2013 and again in February 2015, members of the Georgia Senate 
proposed a bill to expand the statute to include arrestees, but despite 
the King decision, the Georgia legislature has not yet passed a bill on 
the topic.65 Georgia’s current proposed bill allows DNA collection 
from individuals arrested for “serious offenses,” does not include 
explicit limits on what genetic information may be extracted from 
analysis of that DNA, does not limit familial searches, does not 
require an arraignment hearing prior to collection, and does not 
provide procedures for automatic expungement.66 The factors absent 
from Georgia’s bill were important to the Supreme Court in 
                                                                                                                 
relate to the identification of individuals . . . . ”). 
 62. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967; § 2-506(d) (“A person may not perform a search of the statewide DNA 
data base for the purpose of identification of an offender in connection with a crime for which the 
offender may be a biological relative of the individual from whom the DNA sample was acquired.”). 
 63. See generally People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (holding the California 
DNA collection statute unconstitutional under the more restrictive state constitution because the statute 
has no limit on familial searches, allows retention of the physical sample, and allows creation of arrestee 
DNA profiles prior to arraignment), petition for review granted, 342 P.3d 415 (2015); State v. Medina, 
102 A.3d 661 (Vt. 2014) (holding the Vermont DNA collection statute unconstitutional under the state’s 
constitution, because the state’s constitution has a more stringent warrant requirement than the U.S. 
Constitution, despite the statute limiting the use of DNA to identification and prohibiting use for genetic 
or medical testing, including automatic expungement procedures, and requiring arraignment before 
collection); S.B. 77, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015). 
 64. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-160(b) (2012) (“Any person convicted of a felony offense . . . shall . . . have a 
sample of his or her blood, an oral swab, or a sample obtained from a noninvasive procedure taken for 
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis to determine identification characteristics specific to the 
person.”). 
 65. Ga. S.B. 77 (Senate Bill 77 was read on the Senate floor on February 3, 2015, and referred to the 
Senate Judiciary Non-Civil Committee. The Committee favorably reported the bill by substitute on 
March 5, 2015, and it was read for a second time on the Senate floor on March 9, 2015. At the end of 
the 2015 Regular Session, the bill remained in the Senate to be debated during the 2016 Regular 
Session.); S.B. 135, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013) (Passed the Georgia Senate on February, 
26 2013 to the Georgia House of Representatives, then read for a second time in the House on February 
28, 2013.). 
 66. See generally Ga. S.B. 77. 
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Maryland v. King,67 so, Georgia Senate Bill 77, as currently written, 
may not pass constitutional muster. 
II. THE LAW OF IMPLEMENTING ARRESTEE DNA COLLECTION IN 
GEORGIA 
The constitutional grounds upon which criminal defendants have 
challenged state DNA collection statutes are important considerations 
for shaping the ideal Georgia statute, so that the legislature may 
avoid its future abolition. 68  Implementing the proper legislative 
restrictions for DNA collection will allow expanded and continued 
use of this important law enforcement tool and will simultaneously 
protect the rights of arrestees.69 
A. Applying “Reasonableness Balancing” To DNA Collection Acts 
When police collect DNA from individuals, two Fourth 
Amendment searches are involved, and each must survive 
constitutional scrutiny.70 It is undisputed that the act of collecting 
buccal swabs from inside the arrestee’s cheek is a Fourth 
Amendment “search,” 71  but this search is considered reasonable 
when police make the initial arrest based on probable cause.72 The 
second search occurs when police analyze the DNA to create an 
individual profile, which is entered into the CODIS database for 
                                                                                                                 
 67. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967. 
 68. Id.; Alex Sugzda, Note, You’re Under Arrest—Say Ah: Suggestions for Legislatures Drafting 
Statutes Allowing DNA Extraction from Arrestees, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1443, 1459–60 (2013). 
 69. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1968 (maintaining that, although the Court was specifically addressing 
the Maryland statute, many states have similar statutes which the result of the decision will affect); see 
also Sugzda, supra note 68, at 1459–60. 
 70. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches . . . shall not be violated . . . .”); King, 133 S. Ct. at 1968–69. 
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; King, 133 S. Ct. at 1968–69; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
770 (1966) (holding that any “intrusio[n] into the human body” is subject to constitutional scrutiny); see 
also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1968) (reasoning that whenever “cherished personal security” is 
interfered with without a warrant based on probable cause, there should be a constitutional analysis to 
determine if the search was reasonable). 
 72. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) (holding a search incident to arrest reasonable when 
the search is of the arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control, no matter the reason 
underlying the search). 
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comparison with other DNA profiles.73 For the second search to be 
constitutional without police first having a search warrant, the 
legitimate interests of the government must outweigh the interests of 
the arrestees’ right to individual privacy.74 
1. A Well-Established Governmental Interest: The Benefits of 
Collecting Arrestee DNA 
The governmental interests the Court cited in Maryland v. King are 
useful as a guideline to all state legislatures in creating and 
implementing arrestee DNA collection statutes. 75  Implementing 
DNA collection and testing before pre-trial determinations are made 
can reduce the chance that an offender will be released to commit 
another crime, even for a short time.76 The Court focused on the 
importance of DNA analysis technology for law enforcement to 
ensure safety by accurately processing and identifying the individuals 
they take into custody.77 
DNA is an identifying factor for an individual that cannot be 
altered; therefore, it is the most reliable form of identification. 78 
Knowing the proper identity of an individual can help ensure the 
safety of law enforcement officers, other inmates, and the public 
community. 79  However, using DNA as an identification factor 
                                                                                                                 
 73. United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 243–44 (4th Cir. 2012) (determining that searching the 
defendant’s DNA profile in the database was a separate search under the Fourth Amendment); Haskell 
v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2012) (determining that searching defendant’s DNA profile 
through the database is a reasonable Fourth Amendment search because of its substantial similarity to 
fingerprinting analysis); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 407 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(determining that since the government interest in the Pennsylvania arrestee DNA collection Act was so 
acute that it outweighed the personal privacy invasion). 
 74. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970; Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002); Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633–35 (1989); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 
678–679 (1989). 
 75. See generally Sugzda, supra note 68. 
 76. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1973. 
 77. Id. at 1970. 
 78. Id. at 1972 (“The DNA collected from arrestees is an irrefutable identification of the person from 
whom it was taken.”). See also Kimberly N. Brown, Anonymity, Faceprints, and the Constitution, 21 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 409, 433 (2014) (describing that, while facial recognition technology is a 
significant technological advancement, there is still “significant potential for errors and abuse” since an 
individual may alter facial measurements). 
 79. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1972; Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004) (asserting 
that knowing the true identity of an individual can help determine propensities for aggression while 
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presents a paradox:80 the identification of arrestees is necessary at an 
early stage, but it takes significant time to perform DNA analysis 
tests.81 Additionally, it would be improper to enter a DNA profile 
into a DNA database before a neutral magistrate has established 
probable cause for the charge on which the individual was arrested, 
but the identity of the arrestee is important at the probable cause 
hearing.82 In Maryland v. King, the Court dismissed the dissenting 
Justices’ argument that extensive DNA processing time negates the 
purpose of identification by establishing that the importance of 
identification goes beyond “ensuring that the proper name is typed on 
the indictment,”83 and that the time it takes to process DNA “goes 
only to the efficacy of the search for its purpose of prompt 
identification, not the constitutionality of the search.”84 
While officer safety and clerical accuracy are important, proper 
identification of arrestees is also critical for public policy interests.85 
DNA collection from arrestees helps police apprehend individuals 
released on bail for other violent felonies before they commit 
additional crimes.86 Law enforcement having accurate DNA profiles 
                                                                                                                 
incarcerated based on prior arrests or convictions and can keep the public safe when judicial officers are 
asked to make a bail determination). 
 80. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1984 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 81. DNA Casework Unit (DCU) Case Acceptance, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/dna-casework-unit-dcu (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (stating that the average processing rate is at least thirty days). But see Rapid 
DNA or Rapid DNA Analysis, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/rapid-dna-analysis (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (describing how the 
federal government has planned to develop and integrate a form of rapid DNA analysis technology to 
return information to local law enforcement in between one and two hours). 
 82. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967 (justifying the length in timeline through the text of the Maryland 
statute, § 2-504(d)(1) that allows collection at the time of arrest, but the DNA profile is expunged if no 
probable cause is found during the probable cause hearing). 
 83. Id. at 1971. 
 84. Id. at 1976. 
 85. See id. at 1972. 
 86. Id. at 1973–74; BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE 
DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 245 (2000); see also 
Denver’s Study on Preventable Crimes, DENVER DISTRICT ATT’Y, 
http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/Denver’s%20Preventable%20Crimes%20Study.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2015); Chicago’s Study on Preventable Crimes, CITY OF CHI. (2005), 
http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/ChicagoPreventableCrimes-Final.pdf; Maryland Study on 
Preventable Crimes, DENVER DISTRICT ATT’Y, http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/Arrestee_ 
Database/MarylandDNAarresteestudy.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2016). 
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for additional individuals increases the probability that the correct 
individual is incarcerated for a crime and may exonerate a wrongly 
convicted individual. 87  These public policy issues establish the 
proper foundation for the creation of a legitimate government interest 
in extending DNA collection to arrestees.88 
2. Arrestees Have a Lower Expectation of Privacy than Free 
Citizens 
Based on an arrestee’s reduced expectation of privacy, the 
Supreme Court determined that the government’s interests 
undoubtedly outweighed the individual privacy rights, making the 
search reasonable within the limits of the Fourth Amendment.89 The 
Court reasoned that a cheek swab is minimally intrusive and that the 
restrictions Maryland placed on the type of extractable genetic 
information from DNA protected the privacy interests of the 
arrestee.90 
A cheek swab causes an insignificant bodily invasion that does not 
endanger the physical health of the individual from whom it is 
taken.91 Cheek swabs are less intrusive than drawing blood92 and 
other procedures in the administrative processes of booking arrested 
individuals that have also fallen under similar analyses.93 
                                                                                                                 
 87. The Cases: DNA Exoneree Profiles, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment/front-page#c10=published&b_start=0&c4= 
Exonerated+by+DNA (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (explaining that 337 individuals have been exonerated 
based on DNA evidence and that almost fifty percent of exonerations have led to identifying the correct 
perpetrator of the crime). 
 88. See generally King, 133 S. Ct. 1958. 
 89. Id. at 1980. 
 90. Id. at 1977–79. 
 91. Id. at 1979; see also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985) (determining that a critical factor 
in determining the magnitude of the intrusion is the “extent to which the procedure may threaten the 
safety or health of the individual”). 
 92. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1969; see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (upholding 
the constitutionality of drawing blood during jail booking procedures). But see Winston, 470 U.S. at 760 
(holding that compelling a surgical intrusion into the arrestee’s muscle to remove a bullet was too much 
of a personal privacy intrusion to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). 
 93. Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 54, 57–58 (1991) (determining that it is well 
settled that probable cause to arrest both permits police to take an individual into physical custody and 
to obtain his identifying information); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) 
(stating in dicta that even a breath test requires a Fourth Amendment analysis because the deep breath 
needed to provide accurate readings); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558–59 (1979) (upholding the 
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The Court distinguished the search of an arrestee from the search 
of a free citizen by illustrating that when an individual is processed 
after arrest, the booking procedures “involve a relatively extensive 
exploration.” 94  These procedures sometimes involve the arrestees 
“lift[ing] their genitals or cough[ing] in a squatted position,”95 which 
is inherently more intense invasions of privacy than a mere cotton 
swab against the inner-cheek wall.96 The invasive procedures are not 
designed specifically to demean the arrestee or harm individual 
dignity; they are performed for the safety of law enforcement 
personnel to prevent arrestees’ smuggling contraband into the jail.97 
Thus, the safety interests of the community outweigh the individual 
privacy interferences imposed in these procedures.98 Determining the 
proper identity of an individual using DNA analysis is equally 
important to protecting the safety interests of the community, both 
inside and out of the correctional facility.99 
The Supreme Court has previously held that minor bodily 
intrusions are reasonable to determine identifying characteristics of 
arrestees. 100  The thirteen CODIS loci do not reveal any genetic 
information to police besides identification characteristics.101 With 
the statutory protection limiting analysis to identifying information, 
the remaining problem is law enforcement’s ability to keep an 
individual’s physical DNA sample indefinitely with no requirement 
                                                                                                                 
constitutionality of body-cavity searches for pre-trial detainees); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 
(1973) (upholding the scraping of an individual’s fingernails to obtain trace evidence); United States v. 
Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932) (upholding the constitutionality of fingerprinting arrestees). 
 94. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). 
 95. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1520 (2012). 
 96. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1978. 
 97. Id. at 1978–79. 
 98. Id. But cf. Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and The Unrecognized 
Point of a “Pointless Indignity”, 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1010 (2014) (arguing that, instead of advocating 
for personal privacy protections, the Court should focus on whether the individual’s dignity has been 
infringed upon). 
 99. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979. 
 100. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (holding that an individual’s voice is an 
identifying characteristic that is outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. 
Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 20 (1973) (holding that handwriting may also be considered an identifying 
characteristic); United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1932) (upholding the constitutionality of 
fingerprinting); see also Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 58 (1991) (fingerprinting); 
Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (fingerprinting);. 
 101. See FBI FAQs on CODIS and DNA, supra note 24. 
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to destroy the sample. 102  Note that destroying the physical DNA 
sample is different from expunging the DNA profile. 103  With a 
statutory requirement to destroy physical DNA samples, convicted 
individuals could have their DNA sample expunged, yet their DNA 
profile containing only identifying information would remain in the 
DNA database, protecting individuals from future privacy 
intrusions.104 
Many states have adopted statutory schemes requiring DNA 
collection from arrestees.105 Most states with such DNA collection 
statutes list the specific crimes that trigger law enforcement’s ability 
to collect DNA.106 Most statutes also mention expungement of the 
DNA sample.107  Following precedent from the Maryland v. King 
decision and from other state legislatures, Georgia can craft a similar 
statute that will be reasonable under both the State and Federal 
Constitution. 
B. “Georgia On My Mind” 
The Georgia Supreme Court has indirectly acknowledged that 
collecting and analyzing DNA consists of two separate Fourth 
Amendment searches.108 With this acknowledgement, Georgia courts 
have used a reasonableness balancing test to determine that DNA 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Kaye, supra note 35, at 47 (proposing a universal database of DNA profiles that does not allow 
the retention of the physical sample); see also Ferrell, supra note 36, at 257–58 (determining that 
whether or not an individual’s charges are dropped, the state may retain their DNA sample indefinitely). 
 103. Compare Ferrell, supra note 36, at 258, with Sugzda, supra note 68, at 1468–69 (describing 
when there are procedures in place to remove DNA profiles from databases after a charge has been 
dropped, it undermines the argument that DNA collection is for identification purposes only). 
 104. Destroying the physical DNA sample would help prevent its further testing by law enforcement 
once technology advances, should the law fail to keep pace with evolving technology. People v. Buza, 
180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), petition for review granted, 342 P.3d 415 (Cal. 2015). 
 105. See Stuart, supra note 36, at 1158–77 (listing the twenty-nine states that have implemented 
statutory schemes to allow DNA collection from arrestees). 
 106. See id. But see CAL. PENAL CODE § 296(a)(2)(C) (West 2004) (stating that “any adult person 
arrested or charged with any felony offense” must provide a DNA sample). The statute was later held 
unconstitutional under the California State constitution. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 795–96. 
 107. Stuart, supra note 36, at 1158–77. 
 108. Pace v. State, 524 S.E.2d 490, 498 (Ga. 1999) (stating it would be unreasonable for law 
enforcement to obtain separate consent or a separate search warrant every time a properly obtained 
DNA profile is used for comparison in another investigation). 
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collection and analysis from convicted felons is proper.109 Georgia’s 
legislature has already recognized the importance of including 
arrestee DNA profiles in DNA databases by drafting bills during two 
different legislative sessions to implement the process into law 
enforcement booking procedures. 110  The most recent bill has 
enumerated the “serious offenses” that can trigger DNA collection 
upon arrest, but it has not rectified all of the problems with the 
law.111 If passed as written, the proposed bill could be overruled 
based on the application of a reasonableness balancing test.112 
1. Georgia’s Legitimate Interest in Arrestee DNA Collection 
Violence in Georgia correctional facilities has risen in the past 
decade.113 Georgia is among the five states with the highest number 
of prison and jail inmate deaths.114  When an offender receives a 
prison sentence, he is sent to the Georgia Diagnostic and 
Classification State Prison to be screened and classified according to 
his threat level, but these procedures are not currently in place for 
individuals arrested and remaining in jail. 115  The significant state 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See, e.g., Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1342–44 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (noting that the 
search of a prisoner need not fall within the Fourth Amendment’s “special needs” exception, so long as 
the search is still reasonable in that the government interests outweigh the personal privacy interests of 
the inmates, whose expectation of privacy is reduced as a result of incarceration), aff’d sub nom. Padgett 
v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 110. S.B. 77, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015) (Senate Committee Substitute); S.B. 135, 
152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013). 
 111. Ga. S.B. 77. 
 112. Compare Ga. S.B. 77, with MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504 (LexisNexis 2011). See, e.g., 
People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), petition for review granted, 342 P.3d 
415 (Cal. 2015). 
 113. Tyler Jett, After 34 Inmate Deaths, Group Seeks Probe of Ga. Prisons, CORRECTIONSONE.COM 
(July 4, 2014), http://www.correctionsone.com/corrections/articles/7348722-After-34-inmate-deaths-
group-seeks-probe-of-Ga-prisons (citing Bureau of Justice statistics that “[s]ince 2010, Georgia inmates 
have killed 33 fellow prisoners and one officer”); see generally OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 247448, MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS AND STATE PRISONS, 2000–2012 – 
STATISTICAL TABLES (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mljsp0012st.pdf. 
 114. Joy Lukachick Smith, Georgia Prison Violence Rises, TIMESFREEPRESS.COM (Apr. 14, 2013), 
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2013/apr/14/georgia-prison-violence-rises/. 
 115. See generally Male Diagnostics & Classification, GA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, 
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/Research/Fact_Sheets/Info_Sheets_MaleDC.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
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interest in reducing inmate violence adds to the government interest 
posited to outweigh personal privacy interests of arrestees.116 
DNA provides an extraordinary ability for the criminal justice 
system to function properly in its ability to pinpoint precisely the 
individual who committed a crime.117 Georgia is among many states 
with an Innocence Project.118  These organizations seek to reverse 
convictions where DNA evidence was collected at the crime scene 
but DNA analysis was either not used in the course of investigation 
or the technology was not available at that time.119  The Georgia 
Innocence Project is responsible for exonerating seven individuals 
based on DNA evidence, who served an average of seventeen years 
for crimes they did not commit.120 With an expanded base of DNA 
profiles to test against, the Georgia Innocence Project can better 
solidify convictions of the proper individuals and the entire criminal 
justice system will function more smoothly, minimizing the 
frequency of wrongful convictions.121 
2. Georgia Arrestees Have a Previously Stipulated Reduced 
Expectation of Privacy 
The Constitution’s presumption of innocence underscores the legal 
difference between arrestees and convicted felons. 122  Georgia has 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Cf. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013) (stating that “the need for law enforcement 
officers in a safe and accurate way to process and identify the persons and possessions they must take 
into custody” obviously serves a legitimate government interest). 
 117. Stories: The FBI and DNA, Part 1, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION (Nov. 23, 2011), 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/november/dna_112311; see also Brandon L. Garrett, Judging 
Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 63 n.28 (2008) (explaining that the probability of another person 
matching a DNA profile may be more than one in one trillion, which is more than all of the humans that 
have ever lived). 
 118. See Innocence Network Member Organizations, INNOCENCE NETWORK, 
http://www.innocencenetwork.org/members (last visited Jan. 20, 2016) (listing 60 state and international 
members of the Innocence Network, including Georgia). 
 119. See THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
 120. Exonerees, GA. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.georgiainnocenceproject.org/exonerees/ (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
 121. Jordi, supra note 36, at 367 (describing how deterrence theories support the idea that 
comprehensive DNA databanks would reduce crime, but noting that there is minimal research on the 
actual effect of including arrestees in the DNA databanks). 
 122. Murphy, supra note 54, at 175; see also Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) 
(establishing the presumption of innocence as a fundamental right of a criminal defendant). 
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acknowledged that while pre-trial detainees and arrestees have more 
rights to privacy than convicted individuals, that right is substantially 
diminished once they have been lawfully arrested.123 The Georgia 
Supreme Court determined that so long as the search of an arrestee is 
not conducted solely for the purpose of uncovering additional crime, 
the search is reasonable when there is a legitimate security or 
maintenance purpose.124 The search of an arrestee also cannot be 
solely to “further the prosecution’s effort to obtain a conviction 
against [the defendant].”125 
Georgia’s statute allowing DNA collection from convicted felons 
has already withstood multiple court challenges and may give insight 
into how courts will evaluate an amended statute including 
arrestees.126 The Georgia Supreme Court has upheld the statute based 
on the rational intent of the legislature in protecting incarcerated 
individuals and the public.127 While the court only upheld the statute 
for collecting DNA from convicted felons, because of previous 
treatment of arrestees, the rationale may extend to pre-trial detainees 
as long as the legislature exhibits a rational reason for doing so.128 
The Georgia Constitution is stricter than the Federal Constitution 
regarding individual privacy,129 but the Georgia Supreme Court has 
plainly stated that including explicit statements regarding legitimate 
government interests in a statute can assist in outweighing an 
individual’s privacy interests to find a warrantless search 
reasonable.130 Because Georgia pre-trial detainees do not have the 
                                                                                                                 
 123. State v. Henderson, 517 S.E.2d 61, 63 (Ga. 1999) (adopting the application of the Supreme Court 
case Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) that arrestees have a diminished expectation of privacy due to 
the duty prison officials have to safeguard the detention facility). 
 124. Id. at 64. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2005); Quarterman v. State, 651 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. 
2007); State v. Henderson, 517 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1999). 
 127. Quarterman, 651 S.E.2d at 34. 
 128. Id.; see also Henderson, 517 S.E.2d at 63 (stating that, although there is a distinction between a 
“prisoner” and a pre-trial detainee, pre-trial detainees have a diminished expectation of privacy in their 
cells than free citizens in the community). 
 129. Compare GA CONST. art. I, § 1, with U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 130. Donald, 401 F.3d at 1282 (quoting King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 495 (Ga. 2000)) (“The state 
may constitutionally intrude upon a protected privacy interest ‘pursuant to a statute which effectuates a 
compelling state interest and which is narrowly tailored to promote only that interest.’ Law enforcement 
constitutes a compelling state interest.”). 
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same privacy interest in their physical property as free individuals131 
and the state government has a legitimate interest in the collection of 
arrestee DNA, 132  the legislature may summarize the government 
interests in the statute to solidify their intent in passing the bill. In 
doing so, the above stated interests may be properly and consistently 
weighed against personal privacy interests at stake. 
III. CHANGING GEORGIA’S LAW 
The Supreme Court’s decision that Maryland’s arrestee DNA 
collection act was constitutional should lead other state legislatures to 
follow, but legislatures should also strive to make their own DNA 
collection acts superior to other states’ statutes. 133  There is a 
legitimate interest in having all states implement these collection 
procedures to strengthen the national criminal justice system.134 The 
Court focused on many factors,135 all of which should be included in 
the Georgia statute to avoid any future misconceptions or its 
unconstitutionality.136 
The Georgia legislature should implement stricter regulations to 
manage the procedures involved in maintaining the DNA database, 
taking it away from the Georgia Bureau of Investigations so that they 
may impose punishments for the use of “offline” databases and 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Henderson, 517 S.E.2d at 62–63 (adopting the Hudson v. Palmer, 458 U.S. 517 (1984) holding 
that arrested individuals have limited constitutional protections in comparison to those protections 
enjoyed by free citizens). 
 132. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. (detailing how violence has risen in correctional facilities, the 
technological advantages of building a larger DNA database, and how that would help the Georgia 
Innocence Project accurately assist those who have been wrongly convicted). 
 133. See generally Sugzda, supra note 68. See also Marc Jonathan Blitz, Third Party Records 
Protection on the Model of Heightened Scrutiny, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 747, 786 (discussing how the 
American Bar Association’s new Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records 
“provide some hints as to how lawmakers might [require procedural protections the Court has refused to 
require] in the sections on de-identification, retention and maintenance, and disclosure and 
dissemination”). 
 134. 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2012). The statute itself is entitled “Index to Facilitate Law Enforcement 
Exchange of DNA Identification Information.” Id. 
 135. See generally Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
 136. See discussion supra Part II.A. Even with the included factors, courts may still hold the statutes 
unconstitutional under respective state constitutions, which are stricter than the U.S. Constitution, but 
the Georgia legislature’s increasing protections on personal privacy may assist in avoiding a similar 
ruling. See, e.g., State v. Medina, 102 A.3d 661 (Vt. 2014). 
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comply with the federal requirements.137 The use of DNA technology 
is widespread and unavoidable, so greater legislative regulation is 
necessary: through the implementation of a commission, the 
inclusion of the state’s interests in the statute, and the incorporation 
of the specific factors discussed in Maryland v. King.138 
A. Establishing A Commission 
In order to promote the Maryland v. King factors 139  while 
continually monitoring the changing science of DNA,140 states should 
individually establish a commission to maintain the goals of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion. 141  The commission should bear 
responsibility for persistently examining the relevant laws and 
technology, and for maintaining conformity in the event that science 
exceeds the scope of the current law and infringes on personal 
privacy rights of arrestees. 142  In order to facilitate technological 
implementations, the FBI has already implemented a Rapid DNA 
Program Office to facilitate and oversee the use of Rapid DNA 
Testing devices in law enforcement. 143  Having a state-run 
commission in addition to the federal organization will ensure that 
the federal goals are properly applied to Georgia’s laws. 
                                                                                                                 
 137. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-160(c) (2012); see 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b) (2006) (including extensive 
requirements for states to continually partake in the federal DNA database program, states must regulate 
the laboratories that maintain the databases and must only release DNA profile information under 
certain circumstances); GA. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS – DIV. OF FORENSIC SCIS., supra note 12 
(listing the DNA collection and analysis responsibilities of the Georgia Bureau of Investigations). For a 
discussion of “offline” databases, see Joh, Policing and Genetic Privacy, supra note 5, at 286. 
 138. See generally Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013); see also David Alan Slansky, Too 
Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 
1069, 1074 (“[T]echnological and social developments have made or soon will make privacy 
impossible, whether we like it or not.”). 
 139. See generally Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
 140. See Joh, Policing and Genetic Privacy, supra note 5, at 292–93; see also Slansky, supra note 
138. 
 141. See Joh, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 37, at 55 n.131 (suggesting establishment of “a 
permanent commission to oversee [DNA databanks] . . . ”) (quoting Phil Reilly, Legal and Public Policy 
Issues in DNA Forensics, 2 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 313, 317 (2001)). 
 142. Id. See also Emma Raviv, Homing In: Technology’s Place in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 
28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 593, 605 (2015) (explaining how difficult it is to create laws about technological 
advancements due to the unpredictability of today’s ever-evolving technology). 
 143. See Rapid DNA or Rapid DNA Analysis, supra note 81. 
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B. Specific Government Interests 
The legitimate government interests should be included in the 
Georgia statute so that if it is ever under attack, the presiding court 
can properly balance the government interests with the privacy 
interests of the individual. 144  Generally, DNA collection from 
arrestees allows for increased accuracy in the criminal justice system 
and ensures that justice is served on the correct individual.145 DNA 
profile compilation from arrestees will also help keep correctional 
officers safe while working inside correctional facilities.146 Knowing 
the background of the offenders will assist in placing each arrestee in 
the proper prison facility based on his potential for violent 
behavior.147 While the generally applicable government interests are 
important and highly relevant, the interests specific to Georgia should 
also be included in the legislation. 
Georgia prisons and jails have an exceedingly high rate of inmate 
deaths.148 Prison procedures that classify offenders based on level of 
violence should be implemented in local jails to reduce overall 
correctional facility violence.149 For law enforcement to determine 
the proper classification for arrestee placement, it will be helpful for 
them to have each arrestee’s DNA profile connected to previous 
arrests and the related documentation of those arrests.150 Having an 
accurate list of all previous violent crimes the arrestee committed or 
for which he was arrested will enable law enforcement to classify 
                                                                                                                 
 144. W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Requiring Submission to Physical Examination or Test as Violation of 
Constitutional Rights, 25 A.L.R.2d 1407 (2015) (listing multiple situations where a state’s actions were 
valid against personal privacy rights when the statute set forth legitimate government interests that 
outweighed the individual rights). 
 145. See generally Garrett, supra note 117. 
 146. Cf. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1971 (2013) (“The interests are [different than interests 
of searching a physical place] when an individual is formally processed into police custody.”). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Smith, supra note 114. 
 149. See generally GEORGIA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 115. See also Florence v. Bd. of 
Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1520 (noting that individuals arrested for minor offenses may turn 
out to be the most dangerous offenders and giving the example that Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma 
City bomber, was stopped by a state trooper for not having a license plate just after the bombing). 
 150. Laboratory Services: CODIS—NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited July 1, 2015) 
(listing 295,049 offender profiles in the state of Georgia and 5,677 investigations aided through the use 
of CODIS as of May 2015). 
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arrestees according to their violent or non-violent propensities, 
making the jails safer because violent individuals may be kept 
separate from the general population.151 
C. Maryland Factors Applied To Georgia 
In drafting state law regarding DNA collection from arrestees, the 
Georgia legislature should implement the best features of other 
states’ laws.152 Georgia should expound on the minimum protections 
discussed in Maryland v. King to better protect the privacy interests 
of Georgia citizens.153 
1. Identification Factors Only 
DNA collection is necessary to determine the proper identification 
of an individual but can reveal more personal information. 154 
Therefore, law enforcement should be strictly limited to only 
discovering the identifying factors of an individual through DNA 
analysis.155 This limitation protects the medical and genetic privacy 
of the arrestee, the absence of which would upset the balance of 
reasonableness.156 Explicitly limiting DNA analysis to identification 
will better protect individual privacy without inhibiting any 
legitimate government interests.157 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Matthew R. Durose et al., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from 
2005 to 2010, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, NCJ 244205, (Apr. 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
rprts05p0510.pdf (stating that 71.3% of the violent offenders tracked were rearrested for a new crime 
within five years of release). 
 152. Stuart, supra note 36, at 1158–77 (including an appendix of the positive and negative aspects of 
each state statute as of January 29, 2014). 
 153. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
 154. But see Santos, supra note 35, at 596 (explaining that “a forensic DNA profile cannot reveal 
information about your health status, your propensity to disease, or your physical appearance any more 
than your Social Security Number can”). 
 155. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2011) (“Only DNA records that 
directly relate to the identification of individuals shall be collected and stored.”); § 2-512(c) (“A person 
may not willfully test a DNA sample for information that does not relate to the identification of 
individuals as specified in this subtitle.”); King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967. 
 156. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979 (stating that processing an arrestee’s DNA based on the 13 CODIS loci 
“did not intrude on [the arrestee’s] privacy in a way that would make his DNA identification 
unconstitutional”). 
 157. Id. at 1979–80 (noting that when the duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures is included in the 
statute or regulation, privacy concerns are inherently minimized). 
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Georgia’s proposed arrestee DNA collection statute allows law 
enforcement to collect an arrestee’s DNA “to determine identification 
characteristics specific to the individual whose DNA sample is being 
analyzed.”158 The wording of the statute lends itself to an inclusive 
reason for collecting DNA, but should be amended to exclude all 
other possible uses for the DNA sample. Georgia should also 
expressly forbid law enforcement from engaging in familial 
searches.159 Imposing limited uses makes the statute more restrictive, 
and thus, more protective of the individual rights of arrestees. 
The major flaw with DNA and its use for identification purposes is 
speed.160 For the FBI to process a DNA sample, it takes at least thirty 
days,161 but the process could be even longer in state laboratories.162 
The disconnect between DNA collection and analysis will be 
resolved with new technology—Rapid DNA testing—but the 
technology may cause more of an intrusion into personal privacy by 
providing law enforcement with an insight into an individual’s 
genetic predispositions or medical history before probable cause is 
confirmed.163 The creation of rapid DNA technology reinforces the 
need to establish a commission to regulate DNA laws and science to 
avoid both a reduction in governmental interests and an increased 
level of intrusion into personal privacy rights. 
                                                                                                                 
 158. S.B. 77, § 3, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015) (Senate Committee Substitute). 
 159. Jessica D. Gabel, Indecent Exposure: Genes Are More than a Brand Name Label in the DNA 
Database Debate, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 561, 585 (2013) (stating that, if familial searches are allowed, 
there should be specific provisions on methods for searching). Accord People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
753, 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), petition for review granted, 342 P.3d 415 (Cal. 2015); Natalie Ram, DNA 
by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873 (2015) (describing how the allowance of familial 
searching does not recognize that an individual’s genetic information is involuntarily shared with family 
members and since individuals have a cognizable interest in controlling identifiable genetic information, 
familial searches should not be allowed). 
 160. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1983–86 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 161. See DNA Casework Unit (DCU) Case Acceptance, supra note 81. 
 162. State laboratories suffer, more often than the FBI lab, from financial setbacks and are more 
susceptible to delay based on a lack of supply or personnel. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE , AUDIT REPORT: THE COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM 51–54 (2001), 
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0126/final.pdf. 
 163. See Rapid DNA or Rapid DNA Analysis, supra note 81 (providing the details of technology that 
would be able to read and analyze a DNA sample and create an individual profile with no human 
intervention). 
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2. Listing Specific Crimes 
Maryland v. King also discusses the statute’s enumeration of 
specific crimes for which arrestee DNA may be collected, and 
multiple states have successfully implemented similar statutory 
listings. 164  Georgia has proposed legislation that allows DNA 
collection from “[a]ny individual arrested for a serious offense.”165 
The bill also includes the definition of “serious offense” and lists 
twenty-nine crimes that would qualify for DNA collection in addition 
to crimes considered a “serious violent felony.”166 Instead, however, 
the legislature should specify that only violent felonies warrant DNA 
collection upon arrest to better promote the underlying intent of the 
law: reducing the worst kind of crimes and protecting the public by 
preventing those violent criminals from continuing to offend. 167 
Including non-violent felonies does not serve legitimate government 
interests and increases infringement on the rights of a larger number 
of individuals, tipping the balance of reasonableness towards 
unconstitutional.168 
3. Automatic Deletion 
Many states have DNA collection statutes that include provisions 
to automatically delete offender profiles and physical samples if the 
suspect is not convicted or the conviction is overturned. 169  This 
provision best protects the personal privacy interests of the arrestee 
and supports the idea that the DNA profile is only for identification 
purposes during the term of incarceration. With evolving technology, 
the possibility of creating an automated reporting system that ties the 
original DNA collection data to the ultimate court disposition is 
feasible and can be logistically solved and monitored by a 
commission. 
                                                                                                                 
 164. See Stuart, supra note 36, at 1159–77. 
 165. S.B. 77, § 2, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015) (Senate Committee Substitute). 
 166. Id. at § 1 (even listing drug offenses such as possession or use of marijuana). 
 167. Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law 
Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127, 165 (2001). 
 168. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 169. See statutes cited supra note 60. 
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Consistent DNA profile removal procedures are important 
nationally, therefore the Georgia legislature should clarify the 
applicable section in Georgia’s statute. Georgia’s proposed 
legislation allows an individual to request removal of his or her DNA 
profile if the arrest does not culminate in conviction. 170  The 
legislation also lists the paperwork that will trigger “the bureau” to 
purge the records, but does not make this process automatic as it 
should be. 171  The bill places the burden on the arrestee to seek 
expungement, instead of providing for automatic expungement, 
increasing the privacy invasion on the arrestee and tipping the 
balance towards unconstitutionality.172 
4. Disposal of Physical DNA Samples 
Advocates of personal privacy dislike the fact that many 
jurisdictions not only have a “database” of DNA profiles, but also a 
“data bank” of physical DNA samples.173 To protect the personal 
privacy of arrestees, the Georgia legislature should include a 
provision in the code to demand disposal of the physical sample after 
the DNA profile is entered into the database and after a certain 
amount of time has passed.174 
Georgia’s proposed legislation also confuses the definitions of 
“database” and “data bank,” which should be clarified to prevent 
confusion and potential infringement on personal privacy. 175  A 
database is a collection of DNA profiles, but a data bank is a 
collection of physical DNA samples. 176  Georgia’s proposed 
                                                                                                                 
 170. S.B. 77, § 5, 153d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015) (Senate Committee Substitute). 
 171. Id. 
 172. People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), petition for review granted, 342 
P.3d 415 (2015). 
 173. Santos, supra note 35, at 605 n.117. “Strangely, our discomfort with the idea of someone looking 
at a tiny portion of our overall genetic profile in a highly regulated and controlled setting is greater than 
our trepidation about sharing personal information on Facebook or Twitter . . . .” Id. At 598; see also 
Kaye, supra note 35, at 47 (supporting the idea that DNA sampling and profiling is not a bad thing as 
long as the samples are not retained). 
 174. Gabel, supra note 159; see also Ferrell, supra note 36, at 257–58. 
 175. See generally Quarterman v. State, 651 S.E.2d 32, 33 n.1 (Ga. 2007); Ga. S.B. 77. 
 176. Roberto Iraola, DNA Dragnets – A Constitutional Catch?, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 15, 20 (2005) 
(“Databanks store DNA samples consisting of blood, saliva, tissue or fluid. Databases, on the other 
hand, consist of portions of those samples which have been analyzed. The analysis, which yields a 
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legislation includes multiple references to a DNA data bank when 
referring to DNA profiles, which should be amended for clarity.177 
Because of the differences between Maryland’s and Georgia’s 
arrestee DNA Collection Acts, Georgia’s Act likely will not pass 
constitutional muster if challenged as it is currently written. Enacting 
this type of statute will be beneficial to the state as a whole and will 
positively impact crime victims and their families,178 but it should 
only be enacted if it will not be overturned in the future. Therefore, 
the Georgia legislature should incorporate the above changes before 
passing the proposed legislation into law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court determined that collecting DNA from arrestees 
is constitutional if it conforms within certain restrictions to protect 
personal privacy.179 In holding that law enforcement’s collecting and 
analyzing arrestee DNA samples were constitutional actions, the 
Court found that the legitimate government interests outweighed the 
personal privacy interests of the individual, making the search 
reasonable within the limits of the Fourth Amendment. 180  The 
Supreme Court prioritized the specific factors of the Maryland DNA 
Collection Act that the legislature implemented to safeguard 
individual liberties, and as long as those rights are protected, the 
statute is constitutional.181 Other state legislatures—which have not 
already done so—should mirror the Maryland statute to solidify the 
underlying policy interest of strengthening the national DNA 
database and reducing the number of violent felonies. 
                                                                                                                 
genotype or ‘profile’ expressed as a set of numbers, is what is entered into state or local databases.”). 
 177. Ga. S.B. 77, at §§ 2, 5 (including incorrect phrases such as: “identification characteristics of the 
profile resulting from the DNA analysis shall be stored . . . in a DNA data bank” and “an individual 
whose DNA profile has been included in the data bank”). 
 178. Press Release, Ga. Bureau of Investigation, GBI’s DNA Database Has Over 3,500 Confirmed 
Hits (Sept. 24, 2013), http://gbi.georgia.gov/press-releases/2013-09-24/gbi’s-dna-database-has-over-
3500-confirmed-hits (explaining that 409 cases have been solved through the addition of felony 
probationers to the DNA database). 
 179. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). 
 180. Id. 
 181. See generally King, 133 S. Ct. 1958. 
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Since Georgia has a legitimate State interest in collecting DNA 
from arrestees, the legislature should extend the current DNA 
collection statute to include arrestee DNA profiles in State and 
Federal DNA databases. In doing so, however, the legislature should 
carefully craft the statute so that the legitimate interests of the 
government outweigh the risks of infringing individual privacy 
rights. Thus, ensuring that the statute is considered constitutional 
under both the State and Federal Constitutions. The Georgia 
legislature should enumerate specific state interests and the reasoning 
for including each Maryland v. King factor to prevent any 
misapplication of the legislature’s intent in the courts. 182  A 
commission should be established to continually monitor the laws 
and science of DNA collection, so as not to infringe on an arrestee’s 
personal privacy rights in the future.183 These changes must be made 
before the bill is passed in order to avoid its future abolition. 
                                                                                                                 
 182. See supra Part III.B–C. 
 183. See supra Part III.A. 
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